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Abstract—The fundamental changes in power supply and
increasing decentralization require more active grid operation
and an increased integration of ICT at all power system actors.
This trend raises complexity and increasingly leads to interactions
between primary grid operation and ICT as well as different
power system actors. For example, virtual power plants control
various assets in the distribution grid via ICT to jointly market
existing flexibilities. Failures of ICT or targeted attacks can
thus have serious effects on security of supply and system
stability. This paper presents a holistic approach to providing
methods specifically for actors in the power system for prevention,
detection, and reaction to ICT attacks and failures. The focus of
our measures are solutions for ICT monitoring, systems for the
detection of ICT attacks and intrusions in the process network,
and the provision of actionable guidelines as well as a practice
environment for the response to potential ICT security incidents.
Index Terms—electric power systems, ICT, cyber security,
cyber attacks, intrusion detection, monitoring, incident response
I. INTRODUCTION
Power supply is undergoing a fundamental change as In-
formation and Communication Technology (ICT) systems are
implemented by all power system actors [1]. At the same time,
the increased expansion of distributed generation and the inte-
gration of new consumer types (e.g., charging infrastructure)
at the distribution grid level, require rethinking conventional
grid operation [2], [3]. Different actors, grid operators, en-
ergy production, as well as private and industrial customers
increasingly interact, e.g., by offering flexibility and market
mechanisms controlled and enabled by ICT components.
As a result, malfunctions on the ICT level can directly
impact physical grid operation, potentially leading to local or
large-scale power outages. This makes the power system ICT
infrastructure—Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Dis-
tribution System Operators (DSOs), Virtual Power Plant (VPP)
operators, metering point operators, and manufacturers—an
attractive target for advanced cyber attacks [4], as indicated
by the successful attacks on the ICT infrastructure of the
Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 [5], [6].
To prevent such cyber attacks, existing security measures
must be accompanied by a close monitoring of irregularities
and fast incident response. This requires a comprehensive
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as a measure for ICT
networks of power system actors that takes domain-specific
characteristics (e.g., process information) into account [7]. To
obviate the need for long pilot phases for integration into grid
operation, current and advanced security technologies need to
be tested in interaction with primary technology in a realistic
environment. Finally, as even the best security measures do
not offer full protection against complex attacks, non-cyber-
security experts need technical guidelines to quickly decide if
a given event is a cyber attack or failure.
Only an optimal interplay of prevention, detection, and
reaction allows to counter new advanced and unknown threats
to ICT infrastructure in power systems and thus contribute to
system safety and availability. To achieve this goal, we present
our ongoing work on MEDIT to provide methods for actors in
the electric power system to prevent, detect and react to ICT
attacks and failures along the following three segments:
1) As basis for our work, a research and validation envi-
ronment for future distribution grids allows to investigate
complex interactions or deviations from normal operation,
e.g., through ICT attacks and failures. Here, MEDIT relies
on an ICT energy co-simulation environment for large-scale
investigation and a realistic distribution grid laboratory.
2) MEDIT’s approach for the prevention and detection of ICT
failures and attacks on uses monitoring for power system
components to record and observe parameters of technical
systems to detect abnormal behavior as well as intrusion
detections systems to timely detect the active intrusion of
third parties into the ICT infrastructure of energy actors.
3) To support the reaction to ICT security incidents, MEDIT
relies on a realistic training and simulation environment
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to teach technical personnel as well as actionable incident
response guidelines that allow non-security experts to ade-
quately mitigate and repel ICT failures and attacks.
II. ICT INFRASTRUCTURE AND ATTACK VECTORS IN
DISTRIBUTION GRIDS
The demand for real-time information and control of dis-
tributed assets for new operational concepts [2], [3], requires
an extensive and partly parallel ICT infrastructure via private
or public communication channels. This creates new risks and
attack vectors for the entire energy supply system [4], [7].
In Figure 1, we exemplary give an overview of the en-
visioned ICT infrastructure of a DSO in future power sys-
tems. The central Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system, which controls the distribution grid, is
connected through firewalls to multiple networks such as the
company network and the Internet, often used for remote
access. To ensure security for this remote access, an additional
terminal server separates connections and implements addi-
tional security mechanisms such as two factor authentication.
For the actual grid operation, however, the DSO uses a
completely private ICT infrastructure owned and operated
by the DSO. This communication network is often called
Operational Technology (OT) network and is separated from
the normal company network, used for the conventional office
IT such as desktop PCs and printers. Through this OT network,
the SCADA system receives measurements from various grid
assets, e.g., voltage and currents from transformers in substa-
tions, and can even remotely control parts of these assets.
In the past, such control was usually limited to substations
or on-load tap changing transformers. With the increased
expansion of distributed generation units and the integration
of new types of consumers, more and more assets are directly
connected to the SCADA system. Examples include distributed
energy resources such as wind turbines or photovoltaic systems
and intelligent new measurement systems such as Smart Meter
Gateways (SMGWs) which may provide new sensory input for
the SCADA systems, as well as new controllable consumers
such as electrical vehicle charging stations or battery systems.
Based on this ICT infrastructure, we can deduce typical
communication patterns and group them into typical use
cases for different actors in the power system. Using the
resulting use cases and communication patterns, we identify
the following clusters of likely attack vectors:
Direct attack on SCADA system: An attacker attempts to
directly manipulate the SCADA system itself to gain control
over it, disable it, or provoke its malfunction.
Indirect attack on SCADA system: An attacker attempts
to manipulate information to provoke wrong decisions in the
SCADA system (e.g., using false data injection).
Attack on OT network: An attacker attempts to manipulate or
impede functionalities of active OT network components (e.g.,
switches/routers), leading to malfunction or unavailability.
Attack on Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and attached
devices: An attacker attempts to manipulate RTUs to gain
control over them, disable them, or provoke their malfunction.
Fig. 1. In a future ICT infrastructure of a DSO, grid assets are connected to
the SCADA system through dedicated infrastructure and/or the Internet.
Importantly, the inclusion of more and more intelligent
assets into the ICT infrastructure results in the increase of
possible attack vectors. In general, each interface to each asset
is a potential attack vector, which could be used to compromise
the OT network or the SCADA system. Furthermore, each
asset for itself is a potential target, either to gain control over
it, disable it or use it as a bridge-head for further attacks.
Our analysis of attack vectors in the ICT infrastructure of
DSOs highlights the imperative need to support actors in the
power system with methods to detect, prevent, and react to
ICT attacks and failures. While certain attack vectors exhibit
only little specifics to the energy sector and can thus be
countered with traditional ICT security mechanisms [8], [9], a
plethora of threats and risks specific to power systems needs
to be accounted for. Our ongoing work on MEDIT targets
specifically these threats and risks, striving for solutions that
can practically be deployed in the ICT infrastructure of DSOs.
III. RESEARCH AND VALIDATION ENVIRONMENT
As MEDIT aims at the development of practically us-
able and deployable ICT security methods specifically for
the power system domain, we require both an appropriate
simulation environment and a distribution grid laboratory.
A. ICT Energy Co-Simulation Environment
Since both the behavior of the power system and the asso-
ciated ICT network are relevant to develop and evaluate ICT
security technology, an appropriate simulation environment
has to map both domains and their interactions in a suitable
level of detail. Complex interactions between ICT and the
grid should be considered to examine and evaluate questions
regarding the requirements of ICT used and repercussions on
security of supply and system stability through ICT attacks
or failures in a scalable and systematic manner [10]. To
simulate attacks on ICT, special requirements are placed on
the ICT simulation site. The main requirement is an explicit
and extendable simulation of secondary equipment and their
protocol-compliant communication as realistic as necessary.
Furthermore, techniques used in ICT networks such as routing
and packet switching must be simulated realistically to enable
authentic attack simulation. In particular, the environment must
enable the generation of extensive training data for an IDS.
MEDIT evaluates different ICT simulators for their suitability.
Fig. 2. MEDIT’s co-simulation environment uses a co-simulation manager
to interface with domain specific simulators for power systems and ICT.
Only through a realistic simulation, we can develop and
train an IDS before validating it in a laboratory and finally
deploying it in a real environment.
Co-simulation is a valid approach to couple simulators from
different domains and model their interdependence. Different
co-simulation standards, e.g., HLA [11] and FMI [12], as
well as more specific frameworks, e.g., MOSAIK [13] and
Ptolemy II [14], are available. Especially for the simulation of
smart grids, co-simulation has already been investigated from
different perspectives [15], [16]. For example, SGsim [17] uses
OpenDSS for the power flow simulation and combines it with
OMNeT++ [18] to simulate the ICT network.
While these standards and preliminary works provide valu-
able input for our work, we require a co-simulation that allows
us to integrate the developed ICT monitoring and IDSs into
the simulation environment and a protocol-compliant commu-
nication between components on the ICT site. Consequently,
we use the approach of co-simulation to couple suitable,
independent simulation environments for our purposes.
The concept of our environment is shown in Figure 2. To
create uniform interfaces between the domain specific simula-
tors, MOSAIK [13] will be used as a co-simulation manager.
For the simulation of power systems, static simulations based
on PANDAPOWER [19] as well as dynamic simulations for
examination of power system stability based on MATPAT [20]
are integrated into the co-simulation environment. Here, we
will focus on detailed modeling of medium and subordinate
low-voltage grids with a high number of distributed resources.
Based on primary technology used in the power grid, com-
munication processes and technologies as well as generated
data flows are modeled via standardized protocols such as
IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 to generate real process
data traffic. The environment functionally maps the complete
communication chain between the operational layer, station
layer, and the field layer for DSOs. This includes modeling
RTU functionality for aggregation and protocol conversion
Fig. 3. A 10 kV distribution grid laboratory is extended with ICT infrastruc-
ture to represent the whole cyber-physical system of distribution grids.
of process data and modeling of intelligent electronic de-
vice functionality as links to primary technology, locally
implementing control and monitoring capability. This at the
same time represents the logical interface between power grid
simulation and network simulation. In addition, we also cover
the influence of other actors on grid operation, e.g., by VPPs
operators through the simultaneous control of grid resources.
By mapping real process data traffic in the simulation, it will
also be possible to link the simulation with real control systems
and real secondary equipment of the actors under consideration
within our distribution grid laboratory. Thus, the simulation
can be used for scaling the emerging process data traffic within
a real environment as described in the following.
B. Distribution Grid Laboratory
Even if the simulation thus approximates reality, the inte-
gration of the developed technologies in a real laboratory for
validation purposes is used to evaluate the integrability into
real power systems. In particular, more complex systems such
as a SMGW infrastructure cannot be completely represented
in a simulation in accordance with reality and are therefore set
up in the laboratory environment, which is utilized as one es-
sential part of MEDIT’s research and validation environment.
The laboratory at RWTH Aachen University consists of a
medium/low voltage distribution grid including four distribu-
tion substations (10 kV/400 V), several distributed generation
units (e.g., battery storage systems (15 kVA-100 kVA), pho-
tovoltaic inverters (10 kVA-36 kVA), and an 50 kW combined
heat and power emulator), loads, secondary equipment and
measurement devices, that can be interconnected flexibly. As
shown in Figure 3, our existing laboratory is extended by the
required ICT infrastructure to depict the whole cyber-physical
system of the distribution grid, including ICT and relevant
processes of the different power system actors (e.g., DSO and
VPP operators). Our focus is on providing an infrastructure
as close as possible to the reality. Therefore, the laboratory
extension is conducted in accordance with the requirements
of DSOs and VPPs operators.
Via secondary equipment and ICT, the assets are connected
to a local distribution grid control system using the IEC 60870-
5-104 protocol. Additionally, they are also connected to a VPP
control system provided in the cloud using the IEC 60870-
5-104 protocol and the Controllable Local System (CLS)
interface of the SMGWs. Suitable data points are defined
for each asset and thus realistic process data traffic (control
signals, measuring signals, status signals) will be generated,
sent, and processed. Since the laboratory cannot provide an
unlimited number of (physical) assets, it will be linked with
the co-simulation environment in the ICT-domain to enable the
generation of artificial yet validated data traffic to be sent to
the control systems to demonstrate scalability. Consequently,
the distribution grid laboratory is used to show the impact
of cyber attacks on the ICT and on primary equipment as
well as to validate the artificially generated data traffic and
the developed tools for prevention, detection, and reaction.
IV. PREVENT AND DETECT ICT FAILURES AND ATTACKS
MEDIT’s methods to prevent and detect ICT failures and
attacks particularly focus on suitable solutions for ICT moni-
toring and intrusion detection for power system actors.
A. ICT Monitoring System for Distribution Grids
ICT monitoring primarily serves to record and monitor
parameters and status of technical systems. This makes it
possible to detect, visualize, and react to malfunctions based
on data from different sources. In power systems, malfunctions
and disturbances can increasingly no longer be attributed to
primary technology alone. Indeed, current events indicate that
errors may increasingly occur on the IT and OT side [5]. As
corresponding monitoring at ICT level is not yet fully imple-
mented in practice, there is a risk that ICT-caused malfunction
cannot be adequately attributed, leading to a “blind spot” [21].
To ensure reliable fault diagnosis, complex on-site procedures
are therefore required. This can endanger network availability
and system security, resulting in higher downtime [22].
To address this issue, MEDIT will develop an ICT monitor-
ing system that identifies ICT error sources. Currently, DSOs
use different suppliers for ICT components to ensure indepen-
dent and reliable grid operation. Ensuring independence from
manufacturers is reasonable, but complicates data collection
for monitoring. Consequently, MEDIT has to evaluate existing
monitoring protocols for their applicability. Based on this,
a suitable monitoring solution has to be implemented and
integrated. This involves working with existing data sources
or data sources that can be made available with little effort.
The monitoring system should serve as a troubleshooting
reference point for control center personnel without deeper
ICT expertise. Thus, personnel can recognize whether a dis-
turbance of the ICT infrastructure or of primary equipment
is present. As a more advanced concept, security monitoring
could trace the current status of devices more closely with
regard to ICT security. Technologies such as hardware security
modules can be used to better measure the security state. Our
approach provides a solution for the current need, but also
shows the advantages of extended monitoring. Power system
actors can thus find a sweet spot of costs and benefits in terms
of monitoring and continuously adjust their strategy.
B. Intrusion Detection System for Electrical Process Data
Coordinated ICT attacks on power system actors have a
high threat potential. In ICT networks, using IDSs is a state
of the art method to timely detect the active intrusion of third
parties into the ICT infrastructure and thus enable countermea-
sures [23]. IDSs can be classified on the basis of used detection
methods (signature/anomaly/specification-based), deployments
(host/network), used information (network/protocol/process
data), and inclusion of history (stateless/state-oriented) [24].
In contrast to office IT, process networks in the power system
domain have a less heterogeneous structure. This results in a
comparatively low number of different device types and appli-
cations and longer life span of devices, which allows MEDIT
to specifically focus on power system specific communication
protocols such as IEC 60870-5-104. Endpoints in these ICT
networks fulfill a clearly defined purpose and are therefore
limited to a known set of commands as well as communicate
only with explicitly and upfront determined entities, which
eases the specification of network compliant behavior [25].
To detect intrusions on the protocol layer, MEDIT will
improve upon the protocol whitelisting approach [26], a three-
step approach following the principle of security in depth
based on (i) access-control detection, (ii) protocol whitelisting
detection, and (iii) model-based detection. Within the ICT,
we require network borders that define physical units, e.g.,
substations. Then, the goal of protocol whitelisting is to detect
attacks that (i) connect to a substation network, (ii) send or
manipulate RTU traffic, or (iii) scan the network.
For access-control detection, our IDS needs to monitor
existing network participants on the OSI Layers 2-4. Proto-
col whitelisting detection monitors which protocols are used
between endpoints in the network, while a deeper protocol
analysis is performed by model-based detection. To perform
protocol whitelisting, the IDS needs to know the network
configuration and allowed communication patterns. MEDIT
will propose a solution for the IDS whitelisting approach for
power system specific protocols [26].
Furthermore, we will investigate to which extent anomalies
in the area of grid operation can be evaluated as indicators
of successful attacks on compromised areas of secondary and
control technology. Examples are switching commands or set-
point adjustments that have led to a traceable blackout. Faulty
measured values or messages identified by bad data detection
as well as implausible load, generation and substation behavior
and limit violations could also serve as indicators [27]. Attacks
on the parametrization and integrity of the process data are
therefore mapped in advance in the co-simulation and detected
by a distributed network-based intrusion detection system.
On the basis of stochastic methods and graph-based machine
learning methods, e.g., GraphSAGE [28], these indicators and
alarms from signature-based and whitelist methods can be
correlated and the attack scenario can be reconstructed topo-
logically and chronologically. The result of this correlation is
an assessment of the state of compromising for individual OT
and ICT devices as decision support for business continuity.
V. REACT TO ICT SECURITY INCIDENTS
To support and prepare actors in the electric power system
to react to ICT security incidents, MEDIT provides them with
both, actionable incident response guidelines and a realistic
simulation environment for security training.
A. Actionable Incident Response Guidelines
Reacting to cyber incidents and ICT failures does not
only require tools but also operational guidelines with clear
recommendations for actions. However, most guidelines in
place (to comply with different security standards, e.g., ISO
27001 [29] or the German bill on IT security [30]) are mainly
concerned with organizational measures, specifying who must
be informed and what organizational processes should be
carried out. Clear and specific instructions on technical levels
are generally not provided. With MEDIT, we want to fill this
gap by providing actionable incident response guidelines.
The goal of our guidelines is to provide distinct and precise
actions for all employees who potentially have to deal with
a ICT failure or cyber attack - especially those with no
background in ICT, such as control center personnel. As
illustrated in Figure 4, our core idea is to describe observations
from employees’ point of view. Based on each observation,
different actions are proposed, which then can lead to new
observations, providing a starting point for the next iteration.
To demonstrate our approach, we provide a brief example:
We consider an operator, who detects implausible measure-
ment in the SCADA system. The operator uses this initial
observation as entry point for the work with our guidelines. To
enable fast lookup of relevant instructions in the guidelines, all
observations are categorized and indexed. In this example, the
corresponding proposed action is to try to identify the source
of the implausible measurements, enlisting other technicians if
necessary. After performing the necessary steps, the operator
(in our example) derives as new observation that one distinct
RTU is the source of the implausible measurements.
Looking up this new observation in the guidelines, the
operator is instructed to inspect this RTU’s logfiles and con-
figurations. In our example, the operator concludes that the
RTU configuration was altered and unscheduled maintenance
access was logged, potentially constituting a cyber security
incident. Consequently, the information security manager and
other stakeholders defined in the company’s existing incident
response guideline have to be informed and the correspond-
ingly defined process has to be triggered.
Currently, our actionable incident response guidelines
mainly focus on DSOs and VPPs. However, we are continu-
ously extending these guidelines, by adding new observations,
actions, and operators. The usefulness and practicability of
our guidelines is evaluated in different workshops with DSOs,
cyber security experts, and relevant stakeholders.
B. Simulation Environment for Security Training
Besides having actionable incident response guidelines,
those responsible for adequately narrowing down and respond-
ing to failures and attacks within the ICT infrastructure of
Fig. 4. Our actionable incident response guidelines support employees in
reacting to ICT security incidents through an iterative observation/action cycle.
power systems require proper training of incident response
measures. To facilitate such security training, we require an
environment in which cyber attacks on the ICT infrastructure
of power systems as well as as corresponding detective and
responsive measures can be simulated.
In the past, different frameworks for the simulation of cyber
attacks on ICT infrastructure have been developed to facilitate
research and training in security incident response, attack
detection methods, and awareness [31]. E.g., SECPSIM [32]
provides a training simulator for power system infrastructure
security based on mathematical modeling. From a different
perspective, BREACH [33] simulates a small company net-
work, including legitimate user behavior and cyber attacks
against the company, to facilitate incident response research
and training. Contrary, the SWaT Security Showdown [34] is
a capture-the-flag-like security training environment realized
on top of the MiniCPS simulator for cyber-physical networks.
While providing a general good starting point for realizing
a simulation environment for security training for the ICT
infrastructure of distribution grids, these existing approaches
either do not consider the specifics of power systems or lack
a realistic simulation of the ICT infrastructure.
Thus, MEDIT will provide a simulation environment for
security training specifically tailored to the training for reac-
tions to ICT security incidents within the ICT infrastructure of
electrical power systems. To this end, we couple an existing
framework for the simulation of company networks [33]
with both an ICT/energy co-simulation environment (cf. Sec-
tion III-A) and a realistic distribution network laboratory (cf.
Section III-B). To this end, we will connect these networks
with virtual network interfaces (TUN/TAP). We can selectively
insert virtual networking components, e.g., firewalls, routers,
or IDSs (cf. Section IV-B), thus modeling realistic ICT infras-
tructure (cf. Section II). To connect to real world components,
e.g., within our distribution grid laboratory (cf. Section III-B),
the virtual network interfaces can be bridged to physical
interfaces, thus realizing hybrid training environments. In
this setting, we can control which traffic may flow between
company and OT network, down to individual RTUs.
This training environment will allow training operators to
run a variety of attacks, covering the different attack vectors
(cf. Section II). To explore the network or exfiltrate informa-
tion, they can run network scans or copy network traffic to
their own machines. Other attacks may send rogue control
commands to RTUs, causing them to malfunction or even
destabilize the power system. In the most mischievous case,
attacks may manipulate critical components while simultane-
ously falsifying sensor readings as cover-up.
By coupling the different components of MEDIT, our train-
ing environment will provide trainees with a unique oppor-
tunity, as we can run attacks that specifically target power
systems in an appropriate and realistic environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamental changes in power supply lead to an increased
deployment of ICT and interdependencies between primary
grid operation and ICT across all power system actors. Con-
sequently, ICT becomes an increasing target for attacks and
failures that can have serious impact on supply security and
system stability. To counter this threat, existing ICT security
measures must be enhanced with an anomaly monitoring as
well as fast and actionable responses to potential incidents.
In this paper, we presented MEDIT, a comprehensive col-
lection of methods to prevent, detect, and react to ICT attacks
and failures for various actors in electrical power systems.
As a foundation of our work, we reported on our research and
validation environment, including an ICT energy co-simulation
environment as well as a distribution grid laboratory. These
two components can be flexibly coupled to assess the impact
of ICT attacks and failures as well as to validate the developed
methods for prevention, detection, and reaction. To prevent
ICT failures and attacks, we presented an approach for an ICT
monitoring system for distribution grids that allows to observe
the status of assets more closely with regard to ICT security.
Based on this, our IDS for electrical process data envisions
to detect anomalies in the area of grid operation as indicators
of successful attacks on or failures of IT and OT technology.
To support actors in electrical power systems in reacting to
ICT security incidents, we presented our approach to provide
actionable incident response guidelines as well as a realistic
training environment for ICT security.
Currently, we are working on fully implementing the meth-
ods underlying our vision of MEDIT. This includes creating
an ICT energy co-simulation designed to study ICT security,
extending our distribution grid laboratory with ICT, imple-
menting our methods of ICT monitoring for distribution grids
and intrusion detection for electrical process data, crafting
actionable incident response guidelines, as well as integrating
a simulation environment for security training within our
research and validation environment. The developed methods
will be validated in simulation and prototypical deployment
using our research and validation environment as well as
discussed and refined in workshops with DSOs, cyber se-
curity experts, and relevant stakeholders. Our perspective is
to apply our methods and solutions practically in the actual
ICT infrastructure of the mentioned actors and thus provide
important building blocks for securing power systems against
the increasing risk of ICT attacks and failures.
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